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Abstract 
In most empirical studies on civil wars, causes and determinants of conflict have been 
hitherto explored assuming that actors involved were either unitary or stable. However, 
if this intra-group homogeneity assumption does not hold, empirical econometric 
estimates may be biased and policy prescriptions are less reliable. We use Fixed Effects 
Finite Mixture Model (FE-FMM) approach to address this issue. This methodology 
provides a natural representation of heterogeneity when data originate from different 
latent classes and the affiliation is unknown. It allows to identify sub-populations 
within a population as well as the determinants of their behaviors. By combining 
various data sources for the period 2000-2005, we apply this new technique to the 
Colombian conflict. Our results confirm a behavioral heterogeneity in guerrilla’s armed 
groups and their distinct economic correlates so showing that different patterns of 
behavior exist. By contrast paramilitaries behave as a rather homogenous group.  
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1. Introduction 
 
    The study of civil wars has gone far in the latest years. A substantial number of 
works has analyzed in depth the causes, the determinants and the dynamics of civil 
wars. However, in most empirical studies, causes and determinants of conflict have 
been hitherto explored assuming that actors involved were either unitary or stable. In 
fact, in many internal conflicts a plethora of groups exist or even emerge in the 
evolution of the struggle. It is not by chance that there is  growing literature which is 
focusing on this recurring feature of conflicts. Yet, the multifaceted impact of 
heterogeneity is still to be deepened in both theoretical and empirical studies  
In particular, how can we empirically identify different behavioral patterns in 
multiparty conflicts? Is there an appropriate methodology to empirically detect 
diversity within groups using the outcome of actual conflicts? Answers to these 
questions are of great relevance to refine and enrich the knowledge we have about 
actual conflicts, and in particular civil wars. The existence of unobserved latent groups 
in a conflict can lead to empirical analyses that under- or overestimate the impact of 
some important predictors on outcome variables. Therefore, it is particularly 
important to have a robust identification method that allows us to control for this 
source of heterogeneity. The aim of this paper is to show how a new model-based 
clustering technique can be used to tackle this point directly. 
    Therefore, the simple point of departure hereafter is that civil wars have to be 
studied taking into consideration the possibility of a plurality of armed actors. Hence, 
if a plurality of groups exists, it might be argued that they exhibit heterogeneous 
preferences. Reasonably in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, groups can be 
also predicted to exhibit different behaviors. Therefore, we contribute to previous 
research by presenting  a methodology to explore and explain the correlates  of 
different behavioral patterns.  
By using longitudinal data, we illustrate how a Fixed Effects Finite Mixture 
Model (FE-FMM) approach represents a powerful tool in understanding conflicts. This 
technique allows us to identify sub-populations within a population as well as the 
determinants of their behaviors. Needless to say, this is particularly interesting when 
we study actual conflicts because we would be able to figure out the existence of 
heterogeneity in behavior of different groups and whether or not different groups react 
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differently to specific determinants. Stated differently, whenever we know that 
multiple armed groups are active in a conflict, but we are unaware on what actions are 
to be ascribed punctually to each group, by means of a FE-FMM, we can point 
precisely such behavioral heterogeneity and its determinants. In fact, we detect not 
only behavioral patterns but also the possible explanations for them. 
    Needless to say, some theoretical hypotheses have to be available to understand the 
roots of heterogeneous behavioral patterns. We proceed along the lines of two 
complementary hypotheses drawn from the existing literature: the competition 
hypothesis and the inequality hypothesis. The first possible explanation of behavioral 
differences in violence is the competition between groups. That is, albeit on the same 
side of a conflict, different groups are likely to compete to increase their status and 
gain recognition among peers. This inflames conflicts and generates superior violence. 
In particular, this prediction holds also for subgroups that fight to improve their 
status within the organization. In many cases, violence and brutality are not goals in 
themselves or rational tactics but rather means to gain some `promotion'. In fact, 
violence becomes a signal of quality and efficiency. Obviously, if such interpretation 
holds, the larger are the groups involved in a conflict the higher is the probability that 
subgroups take shape, so fueling the overall violence of conflict.  
A second theoretical explanation refers to inequality between groups. On the one 
hand, inequality has to be interpreted as the inequality in capabilities; and, therefore, 
outcome of conflict would depend on the capabilities' ratio of parties involved in 
conflict. On the other hand, inequality may generate a superior grievance in some 
groups with regard to other parties of the conflict. 
    We apply this line of reasoning and methodology to Colombian conflict which is a 
fitting illustrative example in this respect. It is widely known that it has been 
characterized by the involvement of three violent groups: the right-wing 
paramilitaries; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC); and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional, ELN). The Colombian case has received a substantial attention 
by social scientists [see among others the special issues edited by Brauer and Vargas 
(2012) and Caruso and Vargas (2014)]. but less attention has been paid to behavioral 
differences between and within armed groups. For this reason, we deepen this aspect 
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in order to verify whether or not it is possible to observe behavioral asymmetries 
within both paramilitaries and guerrillas. 
    In the end, we can claim several interesting results. First the FE-FMM provides the 
degree of heterogeneity within paramilitaries and guerrillas. A first finding is that 
paramilitaries appear to behave as they are a rather homogeneous body. Moreover, 
when considering correlates of paramilitaries’ activity, they are rather sensitive to 
coca production as well as oil, metal and coal mining. We have found a link between 
paramilitaries' activity and coal areas. 1  By contrast, our analysis confirms that 
guerrilleros appear to be heterogeneous. They have to be divided into two different 
types. In fact, these type differ in terms of both preferences and locations.  A first type 
appears to reflect a clear-cut predatory behavior whereas the second shows a more 
defensive or conservative behavior. In fact, the first type attacks increase with the 
presence of both legal and illegal rents whereas the attacks of second type decrease 
with coca crops (defensive behavior) and is concentrated in less urbanized 
municipalities (with weaker institutions) in the Andean region (the most developed in 
the country).  
    These results confirm that our approach may have interesting applications in the 
realm of positive analysis of conflict and political violence. Needless to say, our study 
has also some relevant normative aspects. In fact, if behavioral differences shape the 
actual conflict, they also would shape the conflict resolution process. In particular, in 
the presence of a significant evidence of systematic differences between violent groups, 
strategies of conflict resolution have to take into account preferences and peculiarities 
of different groups. 
    The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on 
the competition and inequality hypothesis. Section 3 presents the FE-FMM approach,  
while Section 4 applies this estimation strategy to the Colombian case. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 In fact, it was not by chance that some recent judicial inquiries emerged on the so called "blood coal". 
According to witnesses, mining companies were used to support financially paramilitaries to run 
operations against guerrillas (see Moor and van de Sandt, 2014). 
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2. On Multiparty Conflicts  
 
    As noted above, this paper extensively draws insights from works analyzing multi-
party conflicts. Traditionally, the study of conflict had focused on dyadic interaction in 
both interstate and intrastate conflicts, but recently, some works have begun 
analyzing multi-actor conflicts. With regard to civil wars, in particular, works on 
multi-actor conflicts focused on the following aspects: (i) emergence and severity of 
civil conflict; (ii) the impact on the duration of conflicts; (iii) the impact on stability of 
peace agreements. 
    We are more interested in the theoretical propositions that have been produced to 
explore under what conditions the existence of several armed groups can increase the 
severity of a conflict. In a recent paper, Butler et al. (2014) use a formal model of 
multi-party contest to show that the existence of multiple parties increases the 
severity of a conflict. In addition, the authors find that the number and the 
capabilities of rebel groups affect the intensity of the conflict. These predictions are 
confirmed by an empirical analysis on internal armed conflicts from 1989 to 2012. 
    Other works point out that another possible channel may be related to asymmetries 
in wealth, endowments and capabilities. There may be several theoretical 
explanations on this relationship. For the sake of simplicity, consider an armed group 
split into two subgroups. They are asymmetric in endowments and economic 
opportunities. On the one hand, drawing from psychological interpretation of violence, 
as expounded by Gurr (1968), the poorer subgroup may have superior resentment and 
anger, exerting a higher level of violence. On the other hand, poorer subgroup may 
have superior incentives to appropriate the largest possible fraction of some 
appropriable income stream or assets. That is, poorer parties in conflicts have the 
incentive to fight more aggressively in order to improve the current income 
distribution. This was labeled as the paradox of power by Hirshleifer (1991). Esteban 
and Ray (2011) present a model of conflict which addresses explicitly the role of 
within-group inequality, showing that within-group inequality increases conflict. In 
their model, money and time are treated as substitutes. In fact, members of the group 
can contribute with either time or money to conflict. They show that a superior degree 
of within-group inequality is likely to make groups more violent because the 
opportunity cost of time for poorer member decreases. In this context, activism of 
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members is essentially mercenary so richer members can exchange money with higher 
levels of activism from poorer members of the group. Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2012) 
present a model that strengthens this proposition. They show that the technology of 
fighting plays a crucial role in the presence of unequal endowments within-groups. A 
different theoretical explanation on why the existence of multiple groups increases the 
severity of conflict is in Munster and Klaas (2011). The authors study analytically the 
interdependence of internal conflict and external conflict by means of a model in which 
players are partitioned in groups and have to choose whether to fight against other 
groups or within their own group. Under some conditions, groups are to choose 
external conflict rather than internal conflict. That is, external conflict is motivated by 
willingness to predate outside rather than fighting internally for appropriation. Yet, 
when power is insecure within groups, the model also predicts that an internal 
fighting will occur. 
    In recent years, several empirical studies also have analyzed the impact of multiple 
actors on conflicts. Cunningham (2013) explores to which extent the existence of 
faction in self-determination movements is associated with a greater probability of a 
civil war. The empirical analysis covers one thousand and one hundred eighty-eight 
factions within one hundred and forty six movements in seventy-seven countries. 
Results highlight that more fragmented movements, namely those with a larger 
number of internal factions are more likely to be involved in a civil war. 
    Other studies test the hypothesis of competition between groups as source of higher 
severity. According to Gupta and Mundra (2005), the number of Palestinian suicide 
attacks in the period 1991-2003 is the result of both cooperation and competition 
among Palestinian groups. More specifically, previous Palestine Liberation 
Organization's incidents cause current attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, while 
previous attacks by Hamas induce also attacks perpetrated by Islamic Jihad. At the 
same time, Palestinian suicide attacks are also a reaction to Israeli attacks. Similar 
explanations have been provided by Bloom (2004) and Della Porta (1995). Bloom 
studies suicide bombing by Palestinian militants, while Della Porta considers the 
competition among different terrorist groups in Italy in 1970s. Clauset et al. (2010) 
also analyze in depth the dynamics of inter-group competition between Palestinian 
groups. The authors confirm that behavior of Palestinian groups is by no means only 
dependent upon Israeli strategy. In fact, it appears that Palestinian groups' actions 
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are motivated by both Israeli strategy and dynamics between other Palestinian 
groups. Findley and Young (2012) also explore the same hypothesis finding support for 
suicide terrorism. In this vein, Caruso and Schneider (2013) had empirically found 
that a competition between Islamist groups may explain the upward brutality of 
terrorist incidents. Interestingly, Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) study a less known aspect 
of civil wars, namely the violence between rebel groups. Exploiting a dataset for the 
period 1989-2007, they show that inter-rebel violence is more likely in the case of an 
area of drug cultivation. 
    In addition, there is evidence that outcome of conflicts is severely affected by the 
existence of multiple groups. Peace agreements are, in fact, fragile and such fragility 
strongly depends on the presence of different groups (Nilsson, 2008, 2010; Bove and 
Smith, 2011). Furthermore, duration of civil conflict has been found positively 
associated with the number of violent groups. (see, among others, Cunningham, 2006; 
Cunningham, 2010; Akcinaroglu, 2012). 
 
3. Finite Mixture Models with Fixed Effects 
 
    3.1 Methodology 
In what follows, we briefly present the Finite Mixture Models (FMM). They do 
provide a natural representation of heterogeneity when data originate from different 
latent classes and the affiliation is unknown. In general, a FMM concerns modeling a 
certain distribution by a weighted sum of other distributions and is based on the 
following assumptions: 
 
i. Each observation is assumed to be distributed according to a mixture of K 
different components (groups). 
ii. Each component comes from the same family of distributions, but these 
distributions have different parameters. 
 
Recently, FMMs have been extended to panel data analyses (see, e.g., Skrondal and 
Rabe-Hesketh, 2004; Bago d'Uva, 2005; Deb and Trivedi, 2013). In particular, 
considering a short panel set-up, Deb and Trivedi (2013) developed finite mixture 
models with fixed effects (FE-FMM) for two families of distributions: mixtures of 
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Normals and mixtures of Poisson. In this way, the correlation between the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity and the regressors does not affect the identification of latent 
classes. Since a mixture of Normals with fixed effects can be estimated through a 
standard FMM for cross-section data once the within transformation to the data has 
been applied, we use this technique to determine the optimal number of components. 
We start from the following specification: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑑𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,                                                     (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 is the number of attacks undertaken by group j in area i at time t divided by 
the area of municipality i, 𝑑𝑖 is the area specific effect, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the vector of explanatory 
variables, 𝛽 is the vector of parameters and 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) is the error term. For the sake 
of notation, we omit the index j when there are no ambiguities. 
Under normality assumption, we can write the conditional likelihood for the k-
component of the mixture model as follows: 
 
𝑓𝑘(𝛽𝑘, 𝜎𝑘
2|𝑑) = ∏
(2𝜋𝜎𝑘
2)−𝑇/2
(2𝜋𝜎𝑘
2/𝑇)−1/2
exp⁡{∑ −
1
2𝜎𝑘
2
𝑇
𝑡=1 [(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) − (𝑥′𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖′)𝛽]
2}𝑁𝑖=1 ,            (2) 
 
where ?̅?𝑖 and ?̅?𝑖 are the individual means, N is the cross-section dimension, T is the 
time dimension, d=T?̅?𝑖  is a sufficient statistic for di. 
    By denoting with 𝜋𝑘  the posterior probability of component k, the mixture 
distribution can be written as 
 
∑ 𝜋𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑓𝑘(𝛽𝑘, 𝜎𝑘
2|?̅?𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡)                                                  (3) 
 
with 𝜋𝑘 ∈ (0,1) for any k=1,...,K, and ∑ 𝜋𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 = 1. The vector of parameters is obtained 
by maximizing the full-data likelihood function.2 Because ex-ante we do not know 
whether a data point belongs to a subgroup or another, we use the famous expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm designed by Dempster et al. (1977). 
                                                          
2 See Deb and Trivedi (2013) for further details on the maximization algorithm. The estimates have 
been produced using Stata (version 13). 
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    On the basis of posterior probabilities, we assign each observation to the subgroup 
with maximum posterior probability. This is the traditional way in which FMMs are 
used as intrinsic classification models. We measure the quality of our classification by 
using an entropy index. This index ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the classification 
accuracy of a mixture model. Higher values indicate a better classification (see Celeux 
and Soromenho, 1996). 
    An important estimation issue concerns the choice of K. In fact, the number of 
components must be specified before we start the EM algorithm, and we cannot rely 
on any theoretical insight. Therefore, even if in general few components are sufficient 
to fit density well, we use the usual information criteria to determine the optimal 
number of components. More specifically, starting from K=2 and increasing the 
number of components, we pick the model with the largest entropy index and the 
smallest information criteria (AIC, BIC and sample-size adjusted BIC). If the entropy 
index measures the distance among groups, information criteria measure the 
performance of model fit. However, as a rule of thumb, we reject any mixture model 
with an entropy index lower than 0.6. Generally, when the entropy index is less than 
0.6, the fraction of misclassified observations is more than 20% (see Lubke and 
Muthén, 2007). 
 
   3.2 Controlling for Endogeneity and Censoring 
    To avoid any endogeneity bias we use a control function (CF) method to address 
endogeneity issues. Basically, by using an excluded instrument, we estimate residuals 
from a first stage regression and we insert them into the second stage. The intuition 
behind the CF method is the following: if a covariate is affected by the outcome 
variable, regressing this covariate on a set of exogenous regressors would lead to an 
error term correlated with the initial outcome; therefore, including this error term in 
the second-stage equation will lead to less biased estimates. For linear models, the 
control function method mimics a two-stage least squares approach, whereas for more 
complex models the former offers additional advantages (see Cameron and Trivedi, 
2013). Both methods rely on the identification of a proper instrument.  
Finally, the inverse Mills ratio can be used to control for censoring problems 
generated by the fact that groups often target specific areas. 
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4. An Application to the Colombian Case 
 
4.1 A Brief History of the Colombian Conflict 
The origin of Colombian conflict can be traced back to the period known as La 
Violencia. La Violencia begun in 1948 with the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. 
Gaitán, a populist leader of the Liberal Party and the party candidate to the 
presidency of the republic. His death generated an escalation of violence between the 
two principal political parties: the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. This 
period ended in 1957, when general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla allowed Liberals and 
Conservatives to reach the National Front Agreement. 3  However, Rojas Pinilla's 
regime that united the two parties had a strong opposition (Offstein, 2003). During the 
National Front the Liberal and Conservative parties monopolized the Colombian 
political system for 16 years.4 
    In 1963, inspired by Fidel Castro's revolution, peasants, Catholic radicals, students 
and left-wing intellectuals constituted ELN. One year later, communist militants and 
peasants decided to form FARC. Both groups were originated by the conflict in "La 
Violencia" and the fact that other political positions different from those in the Liberal 
and Conservative parties were excluded from the political system. Both groups 
represent rural peasants and colons and oppose rich classes and US interference in 
internal affairs. In some areas of the country and periods, these two groups have 
cooperated, but they have had some armed clashes in other areas and years. In their 
programs, they are against the privatization of natural resources, multinational 
corporations, and paramilitaries.  
    Despite its similarities, FARC and ELN have three main differences (Medina, 
2010). First, FARC always had a political party to express its political positions. 
Under the strategy of using "all forms of fight combined", FARC could express its 
political positions through the Colombian Communist Party (CCP). Differently, ELN 
did not have this type of links with the political system and political positions were 
expressed through social movements. Second, the relationship between FARC and 
illegal drug trade goes back to early 1980s. This might be generated profound 
                                                          
3 General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was responsible for the coup d'etat that ousted Laureano Gómez in 
1953. 
4 The Agreement consisted in that these two parties alternated in power each four years. 
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differences between rich and poor groups within FARC. Instead, ELN committed to 
not be involved in drug trade. This commitment lasted until early 1990s when ELN 
finally entered into these predatory activities. Third, FARC initiated peace processes 
earlier than ELN. Effectively, in middle 1980s FARC did a process with Betancur 
government. This process ended up with the creation of a new FARC political party 
("the Patriotic Union", UP) that signaled the end of FARC relationship with the CCP. 
Afterwards, paramilitaries in coalition with the Colombian army killed most of UP 
militants, so that by the end of 1980s FARC did not have a political party anymore. 
That is, at the same time that FARC had access to huge revenues from drug trade and 
increased its military strength suddenly had no room to express its political positions. 
By the end of 1990s both FARC and ELN being illegal armies that predate resources, 
FARC had a much more strong army than ELN, but with less chances to express its 
political positions. Somehow, the 1998-2002 peace process gave some opportunities for 
FARC to express its political positions (through the Clandestine Colombian Comunist 
Party and the Bolivarian Movement), but large internal differences were already in 
place. 
    On the other hand, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia, AUC) is the coalition formed by most of local paramilitary 
groups. The coalition was created in 1997 to consolidate self-defense groups that were 
created during the 1980s to defend the interests of landlords and drug barons from 
guerrilla. However, in line with the legislation, paramilitaries already existed as self-
defense groups since the 1960s. That is, they aim to protect dominant class's interests. 
In 2003, there was a partial and polemical demobilization process of the AUC. The 
maximum leaders of the AUC were extradited to the US under narcotraffic charges, 
leaving the demobilization process unfinished. In 2005, new paramilitary groups were 
formed by new combatants and factions of the former AUC groups. 
    The analysis of the Colombian conflict has received a substantial attention by 
economists. Vargas (2012) shows that conflict persistence increases with the presence 
of illegal rents from coca crops and legal rents from mining. Besides, the author shows 
that the stronger institutions and the more active military, the shorter the conflict. 
The author makes no claim on interpreting these associations as causes but it is useful 
to summarize the posterior work that to some extent explores the highlighted 
relationships. The analysis of causes of Colombian conflict involves several pieces of 
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the literature. Firstly, regarding the analysis of illegal rents, Angrist and Kugler 
(2008) show that rents from coca exacerbate homicides in regions where guerrilla was 
already in place. The analysis of illegal rents and the Colombian conflict is continued 
by Idrobo et al. (2014), who show that rents from illegal gold mining increase 
homicides and massacres from both illegal armed groups, but do not exacerbate 
displacement. The interpretation of authors is that the presence of illegal gold mining 
opportunities makes illegal armies to fight each other for the control of these regions. 
But, since illegal gold mining is intensive on the use of labor, it does not cause forced 
displacement. Secondly, in the analysis of legal rents, Dube and Vargas (2013) make 
an important contribution to the understanding of Colombian conflict showing that 
(positive) income effects might have opposite effects depending on technology 
production. The authors show that legal rents might either mitigate conflict when they 
are associated to the production of labor intensive goods (e.g. coffee) or exacerbate 
conflict when they are associated to the production of capital intensive goods (e.g. oil). 
The authors show that a fall of coffee prices exacerbates both guerrilla and 
paramilitary attacks (the opportunity cost effect). In contrast, a rise in oil prices only 
increases paramilitary attacks (the predatory effect). The role of production technology 
is further analyzed by Palacios (2012), who finds that it is more likely to have forced 
displacement when violence is associated with the establishment of economic activities 
that uses labor less intensively. Thirdly, the role of military presence is further 
analyzed in Cortes et al., (2012). The authors show that the effect of police on conflict 
is non linear. Initial police deployments increase guerrilla attacks and posterior police 
reinforces decrease guerrilla attacks. Police policies have no effect on paramilitary 
attacks. Finally, Cortes et al. (2014) show that a larger provision of roads helps to 
mitigate the onset of conflict of both guerrilla and paramilitary but only affects the 
intensity of paramilitary attacks. 
To sum up, provided that the presence of coca crops and other illegal or legal activities 
(and the technology they use) varies across Colombian geography as well as the 
strength of institutions and the presence of the legal military forces, this might call for 
different behavior/strategies of illegal armies in different regions.5 
                                                          
5  This paper relates mostly to the literature on determinants and causes of Colombian conflict. 
However, the literature on both economic and political consequences of conflict is also large.On 
economic grounds, it has been shown that actions of both guerrilla and paramilitary decreases social 
13 
 
 
4.2 Data 
    Data come from several sources. The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 
1. The conflict variables come from CERAC, a Colombian NGO specialized in the 
analysis of the Colombian conflict. Their database is based on the number of events 
committed by the actors involved in the conflict. This data is used in most of papers 
mentioned in the literature on Colombian conflict and is explained with detail in 
Restrepo et al. (2004).6 
 
Dependent Variables and IVs 
As dependent variables, we use the number of guerrilla and paramilitary unilateral 
attacks per ten square km perpetrated yearly for the period 1999-2005 at the 
municipality level. The average incidence of attacks of both groups is quite small (less 
than one attack per year per municipality). However, the most attacked municipalities 
suffered up to 30 guerrilla attacks a year and up to 9 paramilitary attacks a year, 
showing that attacks are highly concentrated in a relatively small number of 
municipalities. Since municipalities differ significantly in terms of extension of the 
territory, we calculate the number of attacks per ten square kilometers in order to 
have a comparable outcome for all municipalities. On average, the guerrilla attacks 
more frequently than the paramilitaries.7 Since both groups exhibit a highly skewed 
distribution of the outcome, we transform our dependent variables by taking the 
natural logarithms. 
    As noted above, to avoid endogeneity issue following Gallego (2011), we instrument 
paramilitary and guerrilla attacks using geographic variables. In particular, we use 
the Euclidean distance in kilometers of municipalities to San Vicente del Caguán (also 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
development (Diaz and Sanchez, 2004), and education (Barrera and Ibáñez, 2004; Dueñas and Sánchez, 
2007; Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2009, 2010); and increases poverty (Lemus, 2014). On political grounds, 
Acemoglu et al. (2010) explain the connivance of politicians with paramilitary troops trough an electoral 
mechanism. Moreover, Gallego (2011) shows evidence that support the idea that the guerrilla tries to 
sabotage elections and paramilitary create alliances with certain candidates. None of these 
contributions look at differences of behavior within illegal groups. 
6 Using two different conflict data, Rodriguez et al. (2012) show that no determinant is robust to 
different specifications. We use CERAC data that is used, for instance, in Dube et al. (2013). 
7 The reader should be aware that the Colombian conflict is the consequence of three different forces: 
paramilitaries, guerrillas and legal army. Therefore, a complete analysis should also consider the 
number of attacks launched by the government. However, a three-part conflict would extremely 
complicate the analysis. For this reason, we proxy government intervention with State capacity 
variables. 
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known as El Caguán) as exogenous source of variation in guerrillas' attacks. Between 
1999 and 2001, President Pastrana demilitarized the area around El Caguán in order 
to facilitate the peace dialogue with rebels. During this period, FARCs used this 
territory for training and recruiting, continuing to perpetrate a series of crimes such 
as drug trafficking, extortion, kidnappings, etc. At the beginning of 2001, Pastrana's 
government declared the failure of negotiations and attempted to recover these areas. 
Obviously, this attempt led to a dramatic increase in the conflict especially around the 
demilitarized zone. Therefore, we use the interaction between the distance to El 
Caguán with the temporal distance to the end of the negotiates as IV for FARCs' 
attacks. Since paramilitaries were not part of the peace dialogue, there is no specific 
reason why this variable should directly affect paramilitaries' attacks. 
The instrument for paramilitaries’ attacks is based on the so called Demobilization 
Program. In 2003, President Uribe decided to negotiate with AUC a reintegration 
program. Between 2003 and February 2006, about 17,000 of the AUC's 20,000 fighters 
surrendered their weapons. As argued by Mingorance et al. (2004) and Gallego (2011), 
the paramilitaries' reintegration program was based on the cultivation of oil palm 
trees. This led to an increasing interest of paramilitaries for areas suitable for the 
cultivation of palm trees. 8  Since 2003, AUC started to control these areas by 
contrasting union activities, freedom, and mobility. Therefore, we instrument 
paramilitaries' attacks with an interaction term between a dummy variable indicating 
whether palm trees can be cultivated in a municipality and a dummy variable 
indicating the demobilization period. No evident reason justifies a direct association 
between the possible cultivation of palm trees and guerrilla warfare. On the contrary, 
the project of paramilitary expansion is correlated with the cultivation of oil palm 
trees (Gallego, 2011). 
In the analysis, we control for both time-varying and time-invariant regressors. 
However, when we adopt a fixed effects specification the effects of time-invariant 
regressors and unobservable characteristics are completely absorbed by the individual 
component. This also excludes that our results are capturing geographic determinants 
instead of behavioral ones. 
 
                                                          
8 Oil palm trees need an altitude below 500 meters above the sea level and an average temperature 
between 22 and 32 degrees Celsius (see Mingorance et al., 2004). 
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Time-varying regressors 
    Time-varying regressors include several dimensions. First, we control for the 
population size. This variable comes from the Colombian National Statistics Office 
(DANE from its acronym in Spanish).  
    The economic variables have two sources. First, since there is no GDP at the 
municipality level and many economic variables are collinear, we calculate a 
composite index, PC economy, using fiscal data that are reported by the municipality 
governments to the National Department of Planning. This index is the first principal 
component that is calculated using total income, tax revenue, national transfers 
received by the municipality, expenditure, and investment. 9  All variables are 
measured in per capita terms. Second, the measure of income inequality (i.e., the Gini 
coefficient) is calculated by the DANE. Table 1 shows that municipalities are very 
different with respect to poverty and income inequality.  
We also control for the availability of natural resources which may be contested. 
The variables on coca production come from the Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring 
System (SIMCI from its acronym in Spanish) that is managed by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Colombia. This system uses satellite images 
information that is corroborated on ground investigation. The SIMCI monitors the 
Colombian territory continuously such that the data changes both across 
municipalities and time. We use two variables: Coca and Coca × North. The former 
indicates the number of hectares cultivated with coca leaf, while the latter is obtained 
by interacting Coca with a dummy variable indicating whether a municipality is 
located at the north of Bogota (a region that is usually recognized to be under the 
influence of paramilitaries). The variables on coffee, coal, oil and metals (gold and 
nickel) come from the DANE. They estimate the proportion (in percentage) of the 
production of these resources on the total GDP of the department. We use the ratio 
between this proportion and the department area (in square Km). These variables are 
measured at the department level. Coal and oil production is concentrated in a small 
quantity of departments. 
                                                          
9 In fact, including collinear variable would lead to imprecise estimates; at the same time, excluding 
relevant variables from the model can result in bias. For this reason, we use a principal component 
analysis to summarize correlated indicators mediating between these two problems. The largest 
eigenvalue is 3.897, while the second largest eigenvalue is 0.592. Therefore, using 1 as a rule of thumb 
to choose the number of components, it is clear that the first component already summarizes the 
information we need. 
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Time-invariant regressors 
    When we use a random effects approach, we also include a number of time-invariant 
regressors that can be potentially related to the conflict.  
To capture state capacity and credit institutions (banks) in the municipality, we 
include different variables of institutions.10 They consist of the number of institutions 
per one thousand inhabitants in 1995 at the municipality level. The source is the 
Fundación Social, a Jesuit NGO based in Colombia. The security institutions are 
police stations. The law enforcement institutions are tribunals, notaries and jails. The 
financial institutions are different types of commercial banks. The social institutions 
are hospitals, health centers and schools. The bureaucracy institutions are offices of 
Public Instruments Registry and tax collection offices. Regarding institutions, 
disparities across municipalities are correlated to social institutions, where some 
municipalities have no social institutions. 
The geographical variables come from the Colombian National Institute of Geography 
(IGAC from its acronym in Spanish) and the Colombian National Institute of Weather 
(IDEAM from its acronym in Spanish). The distance to markets is the average 
Euclidian distance to the main four markets of the country, namely, Bogota, Medellín, 
Cali and Barranquilla. It is measured in thousand of kilometers. Rainfall corresponds 
to the yearly average of precipitations in millimeters. 
Finally, we also control for the percentage of population that lives with unmet basic 
needs. Although this measure is also available for the 2005 population census, we use 
data from the 1993 population census in order to have a measure that is not affected 
by the conflict during the period 1999-2005. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (5303 observations, 960 municipalities) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables and instruments 
Guerrillas attacks 0.679 1.836 0 30 
Paramilitaries attacks 0.141 0.581 0 9 
Area 0.727 1.790 0.018 18.381 
IV (Gue) 315.182 949.530 -2374.078 3561.117 
IV (Para) 0.117 0.321 0 1 
Time-varying regressors 
                                                          
10 It is worth noting that, in most municipalities, specially the smaller and poorer, banks are owned by 
the State itself. 
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Coca 74.461 634.492 0 16524.000 
Coca × North 17.926 223.687 0 10566.000 
PC Economy 0.007 2.127 -0.116 118.641 
Gini 0.692 0.111 0.301 1.065 
Coffee 0.027 0.076 0 0.843 
Coal 0.007 0.037 0 0.345 
Oil 0.014 0.041 0 0.350 
Metal 0.004 0.013 0 0.092 
Population 0.415 2.548 0.011 70.299 
Time- invariant regressors 
Security 0.156 0.126 0 1.138 
Law enf. 0.243 0.196 0 1.706 
Financial 0.199 0.158 0 1.363 
Social 0.542 0.411 0 9.990 
Bureaucracy 0.049 0.105 0 1.986 
Dist. Mkts 0.329 0.138 0.164 1.094 
Poors 93 51.555 17.963 10.7877 100 
Rainfall 1876.151 1024.215 160 9200 
Note: Guerrilla and Paramilitary attacks are measured as the number of unilateral attacks per ten 
square kilometers. IV (Gue) is the Euclidean distance between the centroids of each municipality and 
San Vicente del Caguan, the municipality at the heart of the demilitarized zone for the peace process 
held between 1998 and 2002. IV (Para) is a variable that, since 2003, takes value one for those 
municipalities under 500 meters above the sea level. Institutions are measured at 1995. Coca prod is 
the number of hectares cultivated with coca leaf. Coca north is the same as Coca prod, for municipalities 
at the north of Bogota. PC Economy is the first principal component of a vector of variables related to 
the municipality economy, namely, total income of municipality government, tax revenue, national 
transfers, expenditure and investment of municipality government. Gini is the income Gini index. Dist. 
markets is the average Euclidian distance to the main four markets of the country, namely, Bogota, 
Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla. Area is measured in thousand of squared kilometers. Coffee, coal, oil 
and metal areas are the proportion of the production of these resources on the total GDP of the 
department. Security institutions are police stations per one thousand inhabitants. Law enforcement 
institutions are tribunals, notaries and jails per one thousand inhabitants. Financial institutions are 
different types of commercial banks per one thousand inhabitants. Social institutions are hospitals, 
health centers and schools per one thousand inhabitants. Bureaucracy institutions are o¢ ces of Public 
Instruments Registry and tax collection offices per one thousand inhabitants. Poor 1993 is the 
proportion of inhabitants with unmet basic needs. Rainfall corresponds to the yearly average of 
precipitations in millimeters. 
 
    4.3 Results 
By exploiting the panel structure of our data set, we first estimate two standard linear 
models: a random effects (RE) model and a fixed effects (FE) model. Table 2 reports 
the results for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. The first two columns of Table 2 
refer to the number of attacks undertaken by guerrillas. Column 1 contains the 
estimated coefficients for a RE regression model, whereas Column 2 shows the FE 
estimates. We take into account both the reverse causality bias generated by the 
inclusion of the rival group and the fact that outcomes are censored.  
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Table 2: RE and FE estimates for guerrillas and paramilitaries 
 Guerrillas Paramilitaries 
 RE FE RE FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rival group 2.0770*** 2.1661*** 16.9732*** 18.1086*** 
 (55.043) (50.670) (68.966) (103.134) 
FS residual -1.9806*** -1.9846*** -16.0226*** -17.1102*** 
 (353.324) (341.560) (71.328) (116.400) 
Coca -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 0.0019*** 0.0020*** 
 (9.426) (8.651) (54.774) (55.339) 
Coca × North 0.0002 0.0004** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.705) (2.516) (3.457) (3.102) 
Economy 0.0099*** 0.0114*** 0.0034 0.0025 
 (3.166) (3.291) (0.532) (0.369) 
Gini 0.7518*** 0.4701 20.6704*** 19.3386*** 
 (7.676) (0.392) (51.489) (10.587) 
Coffee 0.6488*** 0.7410*** -16.9321*** -18.0512*** 
 (4.544) (3.917) (29.453) (27.085) 
Coal 2.9568*** 12.5132*** 64.5168*** 81.3435*** 
 (7.715) (13.059) (47.624) (45.974) 
Oil 10.4671*** 7.4337*** 76.7500*** 75.2590*** 
 (14.600) (7.264) (67.131) (49.161) 
Metal 14.1883*** 38.2493*** 298.4885*** 374.8775*** 
 (3.582) (7.627) (57.417) (47.073) 
Population 0.0924*** 0.0675 0.2308*** 1.4018*** 
 (4.500) (0.575) (3.538) (7.010) 
Security -2.3789*** -22.5300*** 
 (7.510)  (36.685)  
Law enf. -1.2496*** 0.2583  
 (16.944)  (1.357)  
Financial -1.3270*** -17.4030*** 
 (3.308)  (19.939)  
Social 0.6284*** -2.8927*** 
 (20.667)  (53.701)  
Bureaucracy 3.7081*** 7.7310*** 
 (23.426)  (21.769)  
Distnace to mkts 3.5244*** 23.7923*** 
 (23.895)  (45.375)  
Poors 93 0.0260*** 0.2048*** 
 (22.223)  (69.482)  
Rainfall 0.0004*** 0.0029*** 
 (8.041)  (61.100)  
Mills' ratio 0.9279** 1.8205*** 3.1465*** 3.2918*** 
 (2.444) (4.287) (11.361) (9.142) 
North -0.0165  -0.0331  
 (0.942)  (0.748)  
Constant -10.0134*** -8.3617*** -139.4890*** -130.8329*** 
 (16.060) (8.042) (67.205) (58.000) 
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Observations 5,303 5,303 5,303 5,303 
Number of munic. 960 960 960 
R-squared 0.981  0.891 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show that the number of attacks undertaken by 
paramilitaries has a positive impact on the number of attacks undertaken by 
guerrillas. This means that guerrillas respond to paramilitaries’ attacks increasing the 
number of their offenses. Interestingly, there is a negative correlation between 
guerrillas’ attacks and the production of coca in municipalities located at the South of 
Bogota.11 Besides, the higher the economic development, the higher the number of 
guerrilla attacks. In other words, rebels are particularly active in richer areas. 
Column 3 also shows the existence of a positive association between the number of 
attacks undertaken by guerrillas and the availability of important resources such as 
coffee, coal, oil and metals.  
The positive impact of oil production on guerrillas' attacks captures an important 
feature of the Colombian conflict. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, rebels 
surrounded oil fields and the petroleum industry was at a standstill. The relationship 
between guerrillas and oil companies was complex; the history of Colombia is full of 
killings and kidnappings of oil workers. Moreover, rebels used to target oil and gas 
sector first destructing oil pipelines and then asking for protection fees from firms. 
Today, insurgents continue to attack those areas in which oil production is growing. 
Notice that, even if in the RE specification we control for several time-invariant 
regressors, these estimates are inconsistent. This conclusion is confirmed by a 
Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978). RE and FE estimates for the number of 
attacks undertaken by paramilitaries are presented in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, 
respectively. Paramilitaries' attacks are positively associated with guerrillas' attacks. 
This is consistent with the idea that paramilitary groups were born to fight against 
guerrillas groups. Columns 3 and 4 suggest that estimates in Columns 1 and 2 are 
affected by a simultaneity bias due to the fact that paramilitaries respond to 
guerrillas' attacks and this inflates the conflict. 
                                                          
11  The coefficient of Coca measures the impact of coca production on the dependent variables in 
southern areas, whereas the effects of coca production in northern areas is simply the sum of the two 
coefficients.  
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According to our findings, there is a positive correlation between coca production and 
paramilitaries' actions. Even in the northern areas, although the magnitude is 
smaller. Paramilitaries are active in populated municipalities in which the 
distribution of wealth is more unequal. These regions are mainly urban and suburban 
areas. In contrast, they are not interested in rural areas characterized by coffee 
production. Our estimates also show that, between 1999 and 2005, paramilitaries 
operated especially in municipalities characterized by the presence of mining sites. In 
line with Dube and Vargas (2013), we find that paramilitaries pay attention to oil and 
gas areas. According to Sanchez and Palau (2006), this predatory activity increased 
after the fiscal decentralization put in place in 1991. Moor and van de Sandt (2014) 
argue that, during this period, some coal mining companies in Colombia have 
supported paramilitary groups to protect their interests. Victims and perpetrators 
have reported that companies provided material support and strategic information to 
paramilitaries in order to free the mining region of rebels. Again, given the correlation 
between unobserved characteristics and explanatory variables, a FE approach is more 
appropriate than a RE approach.  
Results reported in Table 2 provide a clear and reasonable picture of the Colombian 
conflict. However, so far, we have treated paramilitaries and guerrillas as two 
homogeneous groups, ignoring the existence of latent classes within each bloc. In what 
follows, we address this issue by exploring intra-group heterogeneity. Table 3 reports 
the statistics we used to determine the optimal number of mixture components. Since 
the FE-FMM for paramilitaries does not converge to a suitable mixture, we explore 
guerrillas’ behavioral differences, assuming that paramilitaries act as an homogenous 
group. As we already said, the decision rule is based on information criteria and a 
measure of entropy. AIC and BIC describe the goodness of the fit and are more reliable 
than the maximal likelihood, which would lead to over-fitted solutions. However, these 
statistics do not take into account the distance among components. For this reason, we 
also consider an entropy index, which measures the capacity of the model to identify 
the latent classes, i.e., the quality of the mixture. 
By looking at Table 3, we can notice that the two-components specification is 
characterized by an extremely high entropy level, but a very poor fit. This model only 
separates the excess of zeros from a more suitable distribution of the outcome. 
Similarly, the three-components specification continues to identify a 25% of the 
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municipalities in which we never observed an attack, while the remaining classes 
contain both zeros and positive attacks. In a four-components model, the size of those 
components characterized by a positive number of attacks remain stably around 40% 
and 30%, respectively. Nonetheless, when K=4, we identify another fraction of zeros 
affecting the initial distribution (component 4). The same is true when we consider 
K=5, but the entropy index is smaller than the one obtained with K=4. Given these 
considerations, we opted for a four-components FE-FMM. We only present the results 
for the components characterized by a positive number of attacks.  
 
Table 3: Information criteria and classification results 
 2 3 4 5 
AIC -10352.7 -12236.5 -12763.9 -13028.3 
BIC -10162 -11947.2 -12375.9 -12541.6 
BIC (Adjusted) -10254.2 -12087 -12563.4 -12776.8 
Entropy 0.976 0.793 0.801 0.793 
# free 
parameters 
29 44 59 74 
Log likelihood 5205.363 6162.261 6440.934 6588.135 
Components 
1 73.24 41.2 40.32 39.37 
2 26.76* 33.08 30.64 26.89 
3  25.72* 23.95* 23.51* 
4   5.09* 5.34* 
5    4.88* 
* Classes composed by censored observations. 
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the FE-FMM estimates. To facilitate 
the comparison, we have also included the FE results presented in Table 2. The 
numeric values used to construct Figure 1 can be found in the appendix. In general, 
FE results are driven by Component 1, which represents the largest component 
(40.32% of observations). Concerning the sensitivity to paramilitaries’ attacks, both 
guerrillas’ subgroups have more or less the same behavior: when paramilitaries 
increase their number of attacks per area by a one percentage point, guerrillas 
respond with a 2% increase in the offenses. In this respect, Component 2 reacts 
slightly less than Component 1. Component 2 fights much less in coca production 
areas. In contrast, Component 1 is more likely to attack northern areas. Therefore, we 
expect a higher concentration of Component 1 in the Caribbean region. Component 1 
tends to attack richer areas. Income distribution does not affect the number of attacks 
undertaken by the two components. Interestingly, Component 1 is more interested in 
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coal and metal areas, while Component 2 attacks especially oil and coffee areas. This 
is consistent with the idea of a rural component of guerrillas. Finally, there is a 
negative correlation between the size of the population and the number of attacks 
undertaken by Component 2. On average, the number of attacks from Component 1 is 
1.15, while the average number of attacks undertaken by Components 2 is 0.67.  
 
Fig. 1: FE-FMM estimates for guerrillas (coefficients and 95% CI) 
 
Figure 2 shows municipalities in different color according to the type of attack that is 
more likely. Recall that a given municipality might experience both types of attacks. It 
is clear that one of the two types predominates in most municipalities. Municipalities 
in blue (component 1) are places in which the war is basically explained for fighting for 
rents both legal (local government revenues, mining) or illegal (coca). Municipalities in 
green (component 2) are places that tend to be less urbanized (main cities of the 
country are marked in blue). This type of attacks are exacerbated by the presence of 
coffee and oil and placated by the presence of coca crops. This might suggest that coca 
crops in green municipalities are likely to be under the guerrilla control. 
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Figure 2: Location of the two components. 
 
 
Component 1 is very significant in the Caribbean region (departments of Córdoba, 
Sucre, Atlántico, Bolivar, Magdalena and Cesar) and in the Llanos orientales 
(departments of Arauca, Casanare and Meta). Both regions are very important for 
narcotraffic and mining activities. Interestingly, Component 2 mainly occupies the 
Andean región, which is the most developed in the country. This type of attacks is 
particularly important in the departments of Huila, Caldas and Quindio.      
 
As is well known the main FARC structures (the blocs) are geographical structures 
that are located in more or less the same areas through time. All blocs cover areas 
with both types of components except for the central bloc (CE in Figure 3) that is 
based on the three departments mentioned above. Figure 3 depicts component 2 by 
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FARC blocs. It is very interesting that the areas out of the Andean region correspond 
to arguably the richest blocs, the eastern bloc (EA, orange), the south bloc (SO, red) 
and the north-west bloc (NW, light green). Those areas are much correlated to coca 
production.    
 
 
Figure 3. Component 2 by FARC blocs. CA: Caribbean bloc; NW: North-West bloc; MM: Magdalena medio bloc; 
WE: Western bloc; SO: South bloc; CE: Central bloc; EA: Eastern bloc. 
To sum up, our technique has distinguished two groups of municipalities, one that 
is attacked more intensively (C1) and another less intensively (C2). Attacks of C1 type 
seems to be more likely in areas which the war for grabbing (legal and illegal) rents is 
strong. Attacks of C2 type are compatible with two different stories: they have to do 
either with municipalities with coca businesses (production or trafficking) that are 
presumably under control of FARC or with less urbanized (less developed) 
municipalities in the Andean region, which happens to be the most developed region in 
the country (an easier prey in hard zone).12  
                                                          
12  Our measures of institutions are sweeped out from our estimation by the fixed effects. Simple 
correlations show that C2 attacks are negatively correlated with all our institutional measures. This is 
consistent with previous work on the involvement of FARC in several aspects of coca businesses in the 
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As a robustness check we have repeated our analysis considering only the period in 
which President Alvaro Uribe was in power (2002-2005). With his “democratic 
security” policy, president Uribe made security the central concern of the government. 
In 2003, the government approved the Plan Patriota, a policy aiming to affirm state 
control. Although the number of attacks coming from both components decreased 
during this period, our conclusions as well as the size of the subgroups remain 
qualitative the same. We have also run a FE-FMM using as a dependent variable the 
number per area of clashes, but in this case no latent class emerged. Finally, to test 
whether our components capture the presence of ELN in the Colombian conflict, we 
exploited information on the number of attacks undertaken by ELN in which at least 
one soldier of ELN was killed. This variable underestimates the true involvement of 
ELN in the conflict. But, assuming the same probability to be killed in areas belonging 
to Component 1 and Component 2 (the intensity of the conflict with Paramilitaries and 
Official Army is not statistically different), we can say that at least 7.3% of 
Component’s 1 areas are characterized by the presence of ELN, while this percentage 
falls to 3.9% for Component’s 2 areas. Overall, ELN faced at least one casualty in 47 
out of 1120 municipalities. This means that our results are more likely to be driven by 
intragroup heterogeneity than by intergroup heterogeneity. Not taking into account 
intragroup heterogeneity make econometric estimates more likey to be biased.  
5. Conclusions 
 
    The main result we would claim for this work is the novel application of Finite 
Mixture Models to study behavioral heterogeneity in actual conflicts. In particular, we 
have empirically investigated the existence of behavioral differences in Colombian 
civil conflict in the period 1999-2005. That is, we have highlighted a behavioral 
heterogeneity in guerrilla armed groups and their distinct economic correlates so 
showing that different groups do exist and exhibit different patterns of behavior. In 
order to do that, we have applied a Fixed Effects Finite Mixture Model to infer the 
existence of sub-distributions within the overall distribution of violent incidents. This 
methodology provides a natural representation of heterogeneity in a finite number of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
south of the country and Llanos orientales (Pardo (2000), Pizarro (2011)); and posterior evolment of the 
conflict that shows that FARC retreated from the center of the country (Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, 
2013) .  
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latent classes. In the light if that, a first result we would claim for this work is 
methodological. In brief, we have proposed a methodology in order to disentangle the 
behavioral differences of violent groups involved in a conflict so `validating' their 
existence and operational peculiarities ex-post. 
    To some extent, we have reversed the conventional logical order of reasoning. In 
fact, we infer whether a conflict involves different groups by analyzing reported actual 
behavior rather than accepting their existence from the start. In fact, as scholars we 
have been used to rely upon historical and anecdotal evidence that provide the 
backbone information on participants in violent conflicts. However, in many real cases 
violent incidents cannot be easily attributed to a specific group because there is no 
claim of responsibility or because information are scarce or manipulated. In addition, 
conflicts may evolve over time even because new groups take shape and eventually 
take part into the conflict in a very erratic way. Therefore, if we assume that the 
actual number of parties involved may be uncertain, we may also assume that actual 
behavior becomes the only signal that could confirm the existence of a specific group. 
Needless to say, this is to be confirmed if and only if each group has its own type, 
namely if it retains some specific traits and characteristics that shape its own 
preferences and eventually its behavior. 
Then, we have applied a FMM to validate our hypothesis with regard to the 
Colombian conflict from 1999 to 2005. We have empirically investigated the 
determinants of behavioral differences between different groups involved in the 
Colombian conflict. Results confirm the multiparty nature of the Colombian conflict. 
In particular, whereas paramilitaries behave as a rather homogenous group, guerrilla 
attacks can be divided into two different types. Type 1 (C1 throughout the text) is 
more likely in a large number of municipalities and those municipalities are attacked 
more oftentimes. Type 2 (C2) is more likely in a smaller number of municipalities and 
those municipalities are attacked less intensively. Type 1 reflects predatory behavior 
and type 2 defensive or tactic behavior. Type 1 attacks increase with the presence of 
both legal and illegal rents. Type 2 decreases with coca crops (defensive behavior) and 
is concentrated in less urbanized municipalities (with weaker institutions) in the 
Andean region (the most developed in the country) (tactic behavior).  
    In sum, the contribution of this work is two-fold Needless to say, if we look at the 
methodological aspect of this work, it might be argued that the use of FMM models in 
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empirical literature on conflict needs further research and additional applications. 
This paper is nothing but an interesting start in this respect. When taking into 
account the contribution to the understanding of Colombian conflict, this paper has to 
be mentioned because it highlighted the heterogeneity of preferences within guerrilla 
groups which have been often treated in the literature as an indistinct and unitary 
actor. 
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Appendix A: FE-FMM Coefficients 
Table A1 reports the coefficients we use to construct Figure 1. 
 
Table A1: FE and FE-FMM estimates for guerrilla 
 FE Comp. 1 Comp. 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Rival group 2.1661*** 2.1388*** 2.0387*** 
 (50.670) (43.314) (66.986) 
FS residual -1.9846*** -1.9667*** -2.0272*** 
 (341.560) (232.349) (251.190) 
Coca -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** 
 (8.651) (8.595) (30.050) 
Coca ×⁡North 0.0004** 0.0004*** -0.0020*** 
 (2.516) (3.328) (9.465) 
Economy 0.0114*** 0.0316*** 0.0028 
 (3.291) (5.657) (0.993) 
Gini 0.4701 0.5873 0.3053 
 (0.392) (0.312) (1.377) 
Coffee 0.7410*** 0.2820 0.7279*** 
 (3.917) (0.738) (7.517) 
Coal 12.5132*** 13.5840*** 9.8032*** 
 (13.059) (8.758) (17.815) 
Oil 7.4337*** 6.2201*** 9.3733*** 
 (7.264) (4.605) (16.961) 
Metal 38.2493*** 46.9271*** 18.0940*** 
 (7.627) (7.878) (5.756) 
Population 0.0675 0.1263 -0.0877** 
 (0.575) (0.830) (2.095) 
Mills 1.8205*** 1.8185*** 0.0767 
 (4.287) (3.627) (0.271) 
Constant -8.3617*** 0.0042** 0.0017 
 (8.042) (2.471) (0.598) 
Log-lik -524.029 6440.934  
Observations 5,303 5,303 5,303 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.  
Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
